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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Quinton Bunn ("Claimant"), is represented by Kent A. Higgins 
of Pocatello, Idaho. Respondents-Defendants, Heritage Safe Co. ("Heritage") 
and Liberty Northwest Insurance Co. ("LNW" or "Surety"), are represented by E. 
Scott Harmon of Boise, Idaho. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations were 
entered by Referee Douglas A. Donohue on October 2, 2008 and an Order 
adopting those findings and conclusions was unanimously entered by the 
Industrial Commission on October 10, 2008. The Idaho Industrial Commission 
("Commission") specifically found Claimant had not filed his Workers' 
Compensation Complaint within the time limitations set forth in ldaho Code §72- 
706 and, thereupon, dismissed Claimant's Complaint. 
Claimant moved to reconsider and, on December 17, 2008, the 
Commission unanimously denied Claimant's Motion, finding that, by his Motion 
to Reconsider, Claimant had merely asked the Commission to reweigh evidence 
already considered in its earlier decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Claimant, Quinton Bunn, was 28 years old on the date of hearing in this 
matter. Exh. A, I; Bunn dep., 6:19-21.' But for a two year church mission in 
1 Though Claimant's pre-hearing deposition is fully contained at Defendants' Exhibit F, citation to 
the deposition will be made to the deposition page and iines. The same practice will be accorded 
the deposition of Lisa Harvey contained at Defendants: Exhibit L and the Carol Beckstead 
deposition contained at Defendants' Exhibit E. 
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Canada, Claimant has lived his whole life in Southeastern Idaho and Northern 
Utah. Bunn dep., 6 - 7. He is a high school graduate. Id., p. 7:13-16. He is a 
certified gunsmith and ardent shooter. Id., 46-49. In the two years prior to 
commencing employment with Defendant Heritage Safe, in addition to his 
extensive hand gun use, Claimant had performed hand intensive work as a 
butcher. Id., 17:15-18:14. 
On or about March 14, 2005, Claimant obtained employment with Heritage. 
Id., 18:19-19:3. He was hired to glue precut sheetrock and carpeting to the interior 
- 
of gun safes. Id., 23:15-24:3. On April 25, 2005, Claimant was moved to a lock 
installation position. Exh. D, 9. To perform his duties as a lock installer, Claimant 
attached locking mechanism and a face plate to gun safes at approximately chest 
height, inserting half inch long screws into pre-drilled holes using a manual 
screwdriver.' Tr., 42:16-18; Bunn dep., 24:19-26:4. On April 28, 2005, give or 
take his fourth day installing locks and his 28th work day at Heritage, Claimant 
asserts that, by the end of the day, he felt weakness in his wrist, like a pulled 
muscle. Tr.. 19:14-20. 
Claimant did not mention to anyone at work that he had any pain or 
problems, let alone that he believed any such pain or problems arose as a result 
of his employment; rather, he proceeded home for the three day weekend and 
iced his wrist. Tr. 21:9-20. The following Monday, at commencement of the 
* Despite Appellant's unsubstantiated comment in his brief, as below, that "Tightening the screws 
required intensive twisting pressure with the wrist" (App. Br. p. 2), the record does not reflect the 
amount of pressure required, but does demonstrate, instead, only that the screws are applied to 
pre-drilled holes. 
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workday, Claimant's hand was swollen and numb. He informed a Ms. Johnson 
that he had a problem, but again made no mention that he thought, surmised, or 
even speculated that the "problem" had any causal relationship with Heritage or 
his work. Tr., 21:21-22:5. Claimant requested that Carol Beckstead, Safety 
Manager for Heritage, make him a medical appointment. H., 22:22-23:9; 
Becksfead dep., 10:21-25. Ms. Beckstead acquiesced and made an appointment 
on Claimant's behalf at Lakeview Clinic, the only medical facility with a branch 
office in Grace, the very small town in which Heritage is located. Id., 11:9-12:19. 
Ms. Beckstead regularly makes medical appointments for Heritage employees, 
both for non-work related and work related concerns. a., 73:58-'i'4:3. 
Ms. Beckstead testified that, a number of years after this routine telephone 
conversation to set an appointment for Mr. Bunn, she simply does not recall what 
she may have said during that phone conversation with Lakeview Clinic. 
Becksfead dep., 14:16-15:22. Similarly, the parties are unable to identify or 
locate who may have taken Ms. Beckstead's call at Lakeview Clinic to see if they 
have any recollection of what transpired during that conversation. Harvey dep., 
9:21-10:ll. We are not, though, left without a clear demonstration of the impact 
of the telephone conversation; as a result of the phone call, as demonstrated by 
Lakeview Clinic's regularly kept business records, Lakeview Clinic understood 
that neither Heritage nor its workers' compensation surety was responsible for 
the cost of the visit, but rather that the appointment was being made with the 
understanding that any associated cost was to be borne by Mr. Bunn, and 
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specifically not by either Heritage or its workers' compensation Surety. Harvey 
dep., 28:18-29:1, 31:8-17. 
Claimant presented to PA-C Brett Smith on May 2, 2005, pursuant to the 
appointment made at his request by Ms. Beckstead. Exh. G, p. 21. PA-C Smith 
diagnosed right wrist carpal tunnel syndrome, instituted medications and icing, 
and suggested that Claimant limit his use of a manual screwdriver. H. After 
arriving at Lakeview Clinic and during the intake process, Claimant completed a 
"patient information" form upon which identified Heritage as the responsible 
party. Exh. 45; Tr., 25:19-26:l; Harvey dep., 10:21-11:7. Upon that 
representation by Mr. Bunn, and not upon any representation by either Heritage or 
its Surety, on May 5, 2005, Lakeview Clinic altered its regularly kept business 
records to reflect that the cost of the appointment was to be borne by Heritage or 
its Surety. M. 31:15-17. 
Claimant returned to Heritage on March 3,2005 and presented them a copy 
of his work release. Thereupon, Heritage convened an investigation in which 
Claimant participated. Exh. D, 6-7; Tr., 33:14-35:ll. On the same day, Heritage 
completed and faxed a Notice of Injury to its Surety, Liberty Northwest. Exh. A, I .  
The following day, May 4, 2005, Liberty mailed its denial of the claim. Exh. B, 2. 
Claimant admits receiving the denial letter. Bunn dep., 38:l-4. Mr. Bunn did not 
again present himself for work at Heritage. Exh. G, 10. 
Additional follow-up was taken with PA-C Smith (Exh. G) until, on his own, 
Claimant presented to Dr. Wolf (Exh. 1, 42), was referred to Dr. Newhouse and 
then on to Dr. Esplin. Exh. H. On May 26, 2005, Dr. Esplin questioned the carpal 
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tunnel syndrome diagnosis upon negative nerve conduction studies, and started a 
search for a vascular explanation for Claimant's symptoms. Exh. H, 6. 
On May 30, 2005, Claimant wrote Liberty Northwest and requested another 
review of his claim. Exh. C. He did not confirm that the letter was ever received by 
Surety and Surety did not respond. The May 30,2005 correspondence represents 
the last pre-Complaint communication between Claimant and either Liberty 
Northwest or Heritage management. Tr., 31:3-17. 
Since that time, Dr. Esplin has conducted two surgeries on Claimant's right 
wrist. Exh. K. From the asserted date of injury through Claimant's medical care, 
neither Heritage nor its Surely have paid any benefits to Mr. Bunn or on his behalf, 
nor have they informed Claimant or any of his medical providers that he was 
entitled to any such benefits. Tr., 31:l-11. 
On May 25,2007, some two years and 21 days after his claim was denied, 
Claimant filed his first Complaint in this matter. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Urging a change in settled ldaho law, Claimant contests the determination 
of the Commission that his Complaint was not timely filed within the meaning of 
ldaho Code §72-706. Respondents contend that the Commission's 
determination comports with settled ldaho statutory and case law and that such 
determination is based upon substantial and competent evidence on the record 
presented. The issues presented are, specifically: 
1. Whether Surety's denial letter of May 4, 2005, in light of changing 
diagnoses by his various physicians, misled Mr. Bunn to reasonably 
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believe that his workers' compensation Complaint need not be filed 
within the statutory time limits; and, 
2. Whether the telephone call by Ms. Beckstead to Lakeview Clinic, 
made at Claimant's request, constitutes "payment of compensation" 
within the meaning of ldaho Code 372-706(2) such that the five (5) 
year statute of limitations there contained is invoked. 
ARGUMENT 
On appeal from a decision of the ldaho lndustrial Commission, the 
Supreme Court gives great deference to the Commission's Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law. This Court exercises free review over questions of law, but 
not over the questions of fact. As restated in Sunquisf v. Precision Steel & 
Gypsum, Inc., 141 ldaho 450, 11 1 P.3d 135 (2005): 
When reviewing a decision of the lndustrial Commission, this Court 
exercises free review over questions of law. Uhl v. Ballard Medical 
Products, Inc., 138 ldaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). 
The question of when a claimant's medical condition becomes 
"manifest" and "preexisting" relative to later events is a question of 
fact. Dumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118 ldaho 150, 155, 795 P.2d 
312, 317 (1990). The factual findings of the lndustrial 
Commission will be upheld provided they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Uhl, 138 ldaho at 657, 67 
P.3d at 1269. "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion." Id. The conclusions reached by the lndustrial 
Commission regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will 
not be disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. 
Hughen v. Highland Esfafes, 137 ldaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 
1240 (2002). We will not re-weigh the evidence or consider 
whether we would have drawn a different conclusion from the 
evidence presented. 
Id., ( emphasis added). 
- 
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This Court has also stated: 
The Industrial Commission's legal conclusions are freely 
reviewable by this Court; however, its factual findings will not be 
disturbed on appeal so long as they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. ldaho Const. Art. V, 59; 
I.C. §72-732; Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho, 56, 
57, 137 P.3rd 443, 444 (2006). The Court construes the record 
most favorably to the party prevailing below, and does not try the 
matter anew. Hart V. Kaman Bearing & Supply, 130 ldaho 296, 
299, 939 P.2d 1375, 1378 (1 997). 
Wichferman v J.H. Kelly, Inc. 144 ldaho 138, 158 P.3d 301, 303 (2007), 
(emphasis added). 
"Unless clearly erroneous, this Court will not disturb the 
Commission's conclusions on the credibility and weight of 
evidence." Painter v. Poflafch Corp., 138 ldaho 309, 312; 63 P.3d 
435, 438 (203) ... This Court will not "re-weigh the evidence or 
consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from 
the evidence presented." Id. (citing Warden v. ldaho Timber Corp., 
132 ldaho 454,457,974 P.2d 506,509 (1999)). 
Sfolle V. Bennett, 144 ldaho 44, 156 p.3D 545, 550 (2007). 
Claimant has not made an argument that the Commission did not have 
sufficient evidence to reach the decision that it did, but, rather, wishes this Court 
to reweigh and reapply the evidence, in defiance of Sunquist, Wichterman and 
Stolle, engrafting thereupon a gloss repeatedly rejected by this Court. 
The statute here at issue, ldaho Code $72-706 provides, in pertinent part 
as follows. 
5 72-706. Limitation on time on application for hearing. 
(1) When no compensation paid. When a claim for compensation 
has been made and no compensation has been paid thereon, the 
claimant, unless misled to his prejudice by the employer or surety, 
shall have one (1) year from the date of making claim within which 
to make and file with the commission an application requesting a 
hearing and an award under such claim. 
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(2) When compensation discontinued. When payments of 
compensation have been made and thereafter discontinued, the 
claimant shall have five (5) years from the date of the accident 
causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational 
disease within which to make and file with the commission an 
application requesting a hearing for further compensation and 
award. 
(6) Relief barred. In the event an application is not made and filed 
as in this section provided, relief on any such claim shall be forever 
barred. 
Claimant has the burden of proving facts necessary to demonstrate that 
that the statute of limitations has been tolled. Dunn v. Silver Dollar Mining Co., 
71 ldaho 398,233 P.2d 41 1 (1951). 
A. NOTHING IN THE SURETY'S DENIAL LETTER MISLED MR. BUNN TO 
HIS PREJUDICE. 
The kernel of Claimant's contention is that, having denied him 
compensation upon the diagnosis rendered by his then treating physician, 
Heritage and its Surety ought stand the risk that the diagnosis may, thereafter, 
be changed rather than Mr. Bunn standing that risk. He asks the Court to invoke 
equitable estoppel to reach such result. 
Here, the Commission has determined that "Nothing in Employer's actions 
reasonably served to mislead Claimant about eligibility for workers' 
compensation benefits." FOF/COL, 4. This Court has held that a Commission 
decision as to whether a Claimant has been misled is a factual findinq rather 
than a conclusion of law. Swenson v. Esfafe of Craner, 117 ldaho 57, 785 P.2d 
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(1990). In reviewing findings of fact, as noted above, this Court has historically 
limited itself only to determining whether there is substantial competent evidence 
on the record to support the Commission's determination. 
Further, this Court has systematically rejected invitations, such as the one 
here given by Appellant, to engraft equity upon the clear legislative language 
setting out the various statutes of limitation in workers' compensation actions. 
Writing for a Court majority in Petry v. Spaulding Drywall, 117 ldaho 382, 788 
P.2d 197 (1 990)~, Justice McDevitt noted: 
[Claimant] argues that it is unjust to require an injured worker to file 
a claim within the statutory time limit where the extent of the injury 
is not discovered until after the time has expired; especially, as in 
this case, where the employer had actual notice of the injury at the 
time it occurred and is not prejudiced by the delay. 
This argument is compelling to the conscience, but this Court is 
constrained by the clear words of the statute. Aristotle said that, 
"equity is the idea of justice which contravenes the written law." 
This Court is not free to impart equity where, as in the case of 
Worker's Compensation, the law in question derives its 
existence solely from the printed words of the statutes. 
Although the result is harsh and arbitrary, it is for the legislature to 
re-examine its policies, and not for this Court to fabricate new laws 
where explicit statutory directives already exist. 
Id. at 383-384, 788 P.2d at 198-199, (emphasis added). 
In Ewing v. Holfon, 135 ldaho 792, 25 P.3d 105 (2001), this Court was 
faced with a case very similar to the case currently at bar. There, Claimant 
Respondents recognize that Pefry is a case in which the Court was required to construe the 
statutes of limitation regarding notice and claim in ldaho Code 572-701 and not the statutes of 
limitation governing time for filing an application for hearing (Complaint) set forth in ldaho Code 
$72-706. Justice McDevitt's logic, though, remains applicable. 
Respondents' Responsive Brief-- Page 13 
sought relief from the provisions of ldaho Code $72-706(1) upon the basis that, 
at the time her claim was filed, the physicians treating her were unsure of her 
diagnosis. Claimant Ewing argued that, because she didn't have a definitive 
diagnosis for her condition, it was unfair to require her file a Complaint within the 
one (1) year following the filing of her claim. In affirming the Commission's 
dismissal of Claimant's claim pursuant to ldaho Code $72-706(1), the Court 
stated: 
Once the notice of claim has been filed, I.C. §72-706 requires that 
an application for injury [sic, hearing] be filed within one-year of that 
date where benefits were not paid. Unfortunately, this mandatory 
language of the worker's compensation statute was not followed. 
Id., at 797, 25 P.3d at 110; see, also, Smith v. 1ML Freight, Inc., 101 ldaho 600, 
- 
61 9 P.2d 118 (1980)~. 
This Court has previously discussed the type of conduct by an 
employerlsurety which are sufficient to mislead Claimant within the meaning of 
ldaho Code §72-706(1). In Bottoms v. Pioneer lrrigafion District, 95 ldaho 487, 
Smith also arises under ldaho Code $72-701 rather than $72-706. Again, though, the strength 
of Court's language, and the fact that, despite such gilded invitation, the Legislature has not, 
though given nearly three decades, retreated from the language of the statute, bears notice. 
This result is harsh and seemingly contrary to the public policy surrounding the 
workmen's compensation statutes. Using the date of 'accident' as the point from 
which the limitation period is to run has been severely criticized by Larson in his 
treatise on the Law of Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 3, $78.42(b), saying: 
'It is odd indeed to find, in a supposedly beneficent piece of legislation, the 
survival of this fragment of Irrational cruelty surpassing the most technical 
forfeitures of legal statutes of limitation. Statutes of limitation generally proceed 
on the theory that a man forfeits his rights only when he inexcusably delays 
assertion of them, and any number of excuses will toll the running of the period. 
But here, no amount of vigilance is of any help. The limitation period runs against 
a claim that has not yet matured; and when it matures, it is already barred.' 
101 ldaho at 603,619 P.2d at 121. 
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511 P.2d 304 (1973), the Court comprehensively reviewed such sufficient 
conduct, including: 
Continuing requests for medical examination and reports along with 
authorizing and paying for back braces (citing, Lindskog v. 
Rosebud Mines, Inc., 84 ldaho 160,369 P.2d 580 (1962)); 
Continued investigation, further hospital and medical treatment and 
discussions as to the payment therefore (citing, Harris v. Bechtel 
Corp., 74 ldaho 308, 261 P.2d 818 (1953)); 
Engaging in consultations and negotiations concerning the claim, 
arranging meetings between Claimant and company officers, 
making settlement offers (citing, Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining 
Company, 93 ldaho 169,457 P.2d 408 (1 969)). 
Ewing, though, teaches that a denial upon a missed or erroneous 
diagnosis is sufficient to mislead a Claimant to his prejudice, thereby 
avoiding the one ( I )  year statute of limitation set forth in ldaho Code $72-706(1). 
Appellant's urgings that he was misled by the fact that Surety denied him 
compensation on exactly the condition he claimed and exactly the condition his 
then treating physicians had diagnosed, though such diagnosis was later 
determined to be in error, misses the mark. 
The Commission's finding of fact that there was nothing in the conduct of 
either Heritage or its Surety which would have reasonably served to mislead Mr. 
Bunn into a belief that he need not comply with the one (1) year statute of 
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limitations set forth in ldaho Code §72-706(1) is based upon substantial and 
competent evidence and ought not be disturbed upon this appeal. 
B. THERE HAVE BEEN NO "PAYMENTS OF COMPENSATION" WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF IDAHO CODE $72-706(2) UPON WHICH THE FIVE 
(5) YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS MAY BE INVOKED. 
Claimant further urges that Ms. Beckstead's telephone call to Lakeview 
Clinic to set a medical appointment for him, made at his request and for which he 
was to pay, somehow constitutes a "payment of compensation" invoking the five 
(5) year statute of limitations set forth in idaho Code §72-706(2). Respondents, 
and the ldaho Industrial Commission, disagree. 
In making his argument, Appellant veers from the path estabiished by the 
record from the very beginning; he presupposes that Heritage either "sent" Mr. 
Bunn to obtain medical care at Lakeview Clinic or, in the alternative, that 
Lakeview's late arising determination that Mr. Bunn wanted Heritage or its Surety 
to pay for the visit, somehow constituted medical treatment. Neither 
presupposition is supported by the record 
(1) Claimant was not "sent" for medical treatment by Heritage or its 
Surety. 
First, Claimant is unable to point to any evidence on the record to 
establish that, at any point before he first walked into Lakeview Clinic, he had 
mentioned to anyone at Heritage that he thought, surmised or even speculated 
that the swelling, discoloration and numbness in his right hand had anything to 
do with his employment at Heritage and was not the result of some unrelated 
event occurring over the immediately preceding three day weekend. Rather, the 
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record reflects that, having uttered not a word to anyone on the prior Thursday 
(the alleged date of injury) Claimant showed up for work Monday morning unable 
to prosecute his work. Tr., 21:21-22-5. With those symptoms, and unable to 
work, Claimant, requested that a medical appointment be set for him. Tr., 22:2- 
23:ll; Beckstead dep., 10:21-25. Ms. Beckstead acquiesced to Claimant's 
request5 and first tried to set an appointment for Wednesday (two days later) at 
the only medical clinic in Grace, a Lakeview Clinic branch office. When Claimant 
determined that was not soon enough, Ms. Beckstead, again at Claimant's 
request, set an appointment at the Lakeview Clinic in Soda Springs. Tr., 22:7- 
23:ll. 
Rather than being "sent" for medical care by Heritage as Claimant 
suggests, the record is clear that, here, Ms. Beckstead performed nothing more 
than a friendly, secretarial, function by placing a telephone call to set a medical 
appointment Claimant, not Heritage, requested. 
(2) Neither Heritage nor its Surety ever paid or "provided for" any 
medical care obtained by Mr. Bunn; there have been no "payments 
of compensation" within the meaning of ldaho Code 572-706(2). 
Second, Claimant relies upon Lakeview Clinic records and the testimony 
of Lakeview's billing clerk to suggest that "payments of compensation" within the 
meaning of ldaho Code §72-706(2) have somehow been made or provided for 
such as to invoke the five (5) year statute of limitations there contained. 
5 While a more urbane mind may find this action by Ms. Beckstead to be unusual, in this very rural 
enclave and with this small employer, it was par for the course. Ms. Beckstead testified that she 
regularly makes medical appointments for employees, both for work related and non-work related 
conditions. Tr., 3523-36:2; Beckstead dep., 13:18-14:3, 23.5-16. 
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Appellant again, though, ignores the record in reaching his erroneous 
conclusion. 
Claimant does not contest the determination by the Commission, upon a 
clear record, that neither Heritage nor its Surety ever "paid for", in the usual 
sense of the term6, any medical care Mr. Bunn received; nor does Claimant 
suggest that he ever received, either from Heritage or its Surety, funds 
representing reimbursement for any medical care undertaken or any income 
benefit pursuant to Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law (e.g., TTDITPD, PPI, 
PPD or retraining). Rather, Claimant constructs a convoluted verbal contraption 
seeking, it appears, to demonstrate that Ms. Beckstead's telephone call is the 
equivalent of "payments of compensation" as used in Idaho Code §72-706(2). 
As noted in the factual recitation, a, pg. 6, Ms. Beckstead, 
understandably, does not have current recall of the exact words used in this 
routine, ministerial telephone conversation occurring more than three (3) years 
earlier. Becksfead dep., 14:16-15:12. Similarly, whether unknown, unavailable 
or simply not offered up, we have no testimony from the Lakeview Clinic 
employee on the other end of the phone line during that conversation. Hence, 
the precise words spoken during the telephone conversation between Ms. 
Beckstead and Lakeview Clinic in which the appointment Mr. Bunn requested 
are forever lost to history. 
We do, though, have a clear indication of what the receptionist at 
Lakeview Clinic understood as a result of the telephone conversation. When the 
6 No money, check or money order was forwarded to Lakeview; no money ever changed hands, 
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appointment was first entered into the regularly kept business records of 
Lakeview Clinic, the appointment was coded, by a Lakeview employee, upon the 
information provided by Ms. Beckstead, as an appointment for which Mr. Bunn, 
not Heritage or its Surety, was to pay. Harvey dep., 28:19-29:1, 31:l-14. 
Certainly, given that action by Lakeview Clinic, it cannot be surmised that Ms. 
Beckstead, Heritage or LNW either paid, or suggested or implied that they would 
pay, for Mr. Bunn's medical visit; that is, they never provided any medical care, 
treatment or benefit to Mr. Bunn. 
Though Claimant would have it otherwise, it is clear, as set forth above, 
that this Court has strictly construed the language of the statutes of limitations 
applicable to workers' compensation claims, including provisions regarding 
"payments of compensation". See, Pefry and Smifh, both supra. 
In line with that strict construction, in Williamson v. Whifman 
Corporafion/Pef, Inc., 130 ldaho 602, 944 P.2d 1365 (rehrg. denied, 1997), this 
Court affirmed a Commission determination that there had been no "payments of 
compensation" within the meaning of ldaho Code $72-706(2) when Surety had 
actually paid for medical care upon a mistaken belief that treatment rendered 
related to an old accepted claim rather than to a new claim upon which Claimant 
had failed to make timely notice. Similarly, in Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade 
Plywood Mill, 11 1 ldaho 79, 721 P.2d 179 (rehrg. denied, 1986), this Court 
affirmed a determination that payments made to an injured employee under a 
group health or group disability policy were not payments "made under the 
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provisions" of the workers' compensation law and, consequently, did not invoke 
the IC $72-706(2) extended statute of limitations: 
Secondly, and more importantly, 72-706(2) only extends the statute 
of limitations "when payments of compensation have been made 
and thereafter discontinued ...." (Emphasis added.) There has been 
no payment of "compensationn in this case by the employer. 
"Compensation" is a word of art under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act and refers to income and medical benefits 
"made under the provisions of this law," 1.C $72-702(5), (12) and 
(15). Payments made to an employee under group health policies 
or group disability policies are not payments "made under the 
provisions of this law," and accordingly the medical and insurance 
benefits paid under the group policies provided by the employer are 
not "payments of compensation" within the meaning of 72-706(2), 
and for this additional reason I.C. $72-706(2) is inapplicable on the 
facts of this case. 
Id. at 83, 721 P.2d at 183. If neither payments actually made upon a mistaken 
-
belief that the treatment related to a compensabie event (Williamson, supra) nor 
payments actually made pursuant to a group health or disability policy rather 
than pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Bainbridge) constitute 
"payment of compensation" within the meaning of ldaho Code $72-706(2), then, 
certainly, a telephone call made at Claimant's request to set a medical 
appointment for which he was to pay is neither a "payment of compensation." 
Claimant would have this Court believe that there ought not be anything 
magical about the transfer of money when considering the phrase "payments of 
compensation'' in ldaho Code $72-706(2) and that, therefore, the Commission's 
decision below is in error. This Court's decision in Figueroa v. Asarco, Inc., 126 
ldaho 602, 888 P.2d 381 (1995), however, leads to a different conclusion. Facts 
as found by the Commission in proceedings below demonstrate that Claimant 
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Figueroa injured his knee in 1986. The injury was accepted and time loss benefits 
were paid. On January 27, 1987, the treating physician rated Claimant at 5% PPI 
and corresponded with Asarco to that effect. Asarco received the rating but, due 
to personnel changes, payment for the rating fell through the cracks. Asarco did, 
though, continue to provide medical benefits through May 14, 1987. On February 
5, 1988, the Commission contacted Asarco and, attempting to put the case in a 
closure posture, instructed Asarco to pay the outstanding PPI award. Asarco 
assured the Commission that it would pay the PPI as soon as it found out where 
Claimant was living. Claimant's PPI again fell through the cracks and it was not 
until some four years later that Asarco finally remitted the 5% PPI to Claimant, 
without interest. On August 12, 1992, one year beyond the five year statute of 
limitations, Claimant filed a Complaint. Upon Asarco's motion, the Industrial 
Commission dismissed Figueroa's Complaint as not filed within the statute of 
limitations. Though recognizing that Asarco's actions were dilatory, the Court, 
asserting that "workers' compensation is purely a statutory creation", upheld the 
Commission's dismissal. I_d. at 603, 888 P.2d at 382. 
Then, in Salas v. J. R. Simplot Co., 138 ldaho 212, 61 P.3d 569 (2002), the 
Court put to rest any argument that Figueroa was an outdated ruling based upon a 
prior statute by reaffirming its earlier stand. 
Having demonstrated that neither Heritage nor its Surety paid, offered to 
pay, or implied it would make any "payments of compensation" within the 
meaning of ldaho Code §72-706(2), it is clear that the Industrial Commission had 
it right here: to determine whether there have been "payments of compensation" 
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within the meaning of ldaho Code 372-706(2), there must be not only a 
demonstration of actual payment (money changing hands), but additionally that 
such actual payments were "made under the provisions of' the Worker's 
Compensation Act. 
CONCLUSION 
ClaimanffAppellant has not carried his burden of proof that the 
Commission erred in determining that he failed to file a Complaint within the time 
set forth in ldaho Code 372-706. The Commission found that Claimant was not 
misled to his prejudice by the employer or surety so as to avoid application of the 
one ( I )  year statute of limitations set forth in ldaho Code 372-706(1) and that 
there had been no "payments of compensation" within the meaning of ldaho 
Code 372-706(2) upon which the extended five (5) year statute of limitations 
there contained may be invoked. Thereupon, Respondents, Heritage and its 
Surety, pray this Honorable Court reject Claimant's appeal and affirm the 
decision of the Industrial Commission filed on October 10, 2008. 
Respectfully submitted t h i a % a y  of May, 2008. 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, 
WHITTIER & DAY 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
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